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RACE, SPACE, AND THE PUERTO RICAN CITIZENSHIP
CHARLES R. VENATOR SANTIAGO*
On April 12, 1900, the Congress of the United States enacted the
Foraker Act of 1900,' which replaced the governing military regime in
Puerto Rico with a civil form of governance.2 Section VII of this act cre-
ated a Puerto Rican citizenship for the residents of the island.3 This citi-
zenship was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 1904 by
its ruling in Gonzales v. Williams. The Puerto Rican citizenship was
again reaffirmed on November 18, 1997, by the Puerto Rican Supreme
Court through its ruling in Miriam J. Ramtrez de Ferrer v. Juan Mari
Brds.' Mari Brds, however, through his renouncing of U.S. Citizenship,
sought to redefine Section VII as a source of law that recognized a
Puerto Rican nationality separate from that of the United States.
6
Rogers M. Smith contends that U.S. "justices were apparently will-
ing for Puerto Ricans, like other peoples of color, to be designated
'American' so long as what that meant in terms of citizenship status re-
mained unclear."7 Smith's argument suggests that the Puerto Rican citi-
zenship is a direct result of the racist ideologies of the moment. In this
paper I would like to analyze this argument by arguing that the Puerto
Rican citizenship is directly linked to a status of space that was in turn
created by racist ideologies. In other words, while it is evident that there
is a relationship between the Puerto Rican citizenship and the racial ide-
ologies of the progressive era, this relationship is mediated by a spatial
configuration.
The Puerto Rican spatial configuration that I am alluding to can be
understood as a liminal condition. This notion of a liminal condition is
informed by a reading of Michel Foucault's notion of the liminal, which
he uses to explain the status of the madman at the dawn of the Renais-
* University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Department of Political Science.
venator2@hotmail.com. I am indebted to Sylvia Lazos, Ric Townes, and Bianca Erickson for their
encouragement and support in this project.
1. 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
2. Id.
3. lit at § VII.
4. 192 U.S. 1, 7 (1904).
5. Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, No. CT-96-14 (November 18, 1997).
6. Id.
7. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFUCrING VISIONS OF CnZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 438 (1997).
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sance.8 Explaining how madmen were generally placed on ships and fer-
ried away from the city, Foucault argues that
The madman's voyage is at once a rigorous division and an absolute
Passage. In one sense, it simply develops, across a half-real, half-
imaginary geography, the madman's liminal position on the horizon of
medieval concern - a position symbolized and made real at the same
time by the madman's privilege of being confined within the city gates:
his exclusion must enclose him; if he cannot and must not have another
prison than the threshold itself, he is kept at the point of passage. He is
put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely. A highly symbolic po-
sition, which will doubtless remain his until our own day, if we are
willing to admit that what was formerly a visible fortress of order has
now become the castle of our conscience.9
In the context of Puerto Rico, this argument would suggest that the
Puerto Rican space is located on the horizon or the juridical line separat-
ing the foreign from the domestic. The political expression of this juridi-
cal status could suggest that Puerto Rico is somewhere in between colo-
nial and territorial status. My contention in this paper is that this ambigu-
ous condition facilitated the creation of a Puerto Rican citizenship that
could be distinguished from an Anglo-American citizenship and an alien
status. Moreover, this ambiguous condition served as a prison for the
Puerto Rican citizen, preventing him from becoming either an Anglo-
American citizen or a citizen of a sovereign nation-state. It also resulted
in a status that was not entitled to the constitutional protections and civil
liberties guaranteed to the U.S. citizen and the alien.
I. ANTECEDENTS
Smith contends that citizenship during the Progressive Era could be
understood within a four-tiered hierarchical structure, which included the
following:
[F]irst, the excluded status of people denied entry to and subject to the
expulsion from the U.S., generally owing to their ethnic or ideological
traits; second, colonial subjectship, reserved chiefly for territorial in-
habitants declared racially ineligible for citizenship; third, second class
citizenship, usually understood as required by impartial grants of for-
mal citizenship to races not capable of exercising it, and as the proper
status for women; and fourth full citizenship, including voting rights.
In principle, the Puerto Rican citizenship could be located somewhere
between the second and third tiers. This argument, however, does not
8. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE
AGE OF REASON 11 (1965).
9. Id.
10. SMI, supra note 7, at 429.
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account for the juridical creation of the Puerto Rican citizenship. In ad-
dition, it is unclear whether Smith's conception of citizenship can exist
independent of a national imagining. Smith's notion of the relationship
of the citizen to the nation does not account for a liminal spatial status,
with liminal citizens, within the nation."
In my opinion, there are at least two constitutional precedents that
could be used to explain the Puerto Rican citizenship paradigm. The first
can be traced to the early founding of the U.S. and located in the debates
regarding the Federalist enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts of
1798.12 Under the climate of these laws, it is possible to locate two juridi-
cal conceptions of citizenship, namely a State and a Federal citizenship.
Certainly the Supreme Court's early rulings on its jurisdiction over cases
arising between "citizens of different states" under article 1I' 3 suggests
some possible parallels to the question at hand. 14 The problem, however,
is that in these early cases states continued to claim a level of sovereignty
that threatened the possibility of a federal government. In the case of
Puerto Rico, the territory posed no threat to the Union, and because of its
territorial condition, it could not make a claim to share in power with
other states. Moreover, it would seem that the 14 Amendment created a
national conception of citizenship that would have precluded a Puerto
Rican citizenship. Is
A second possible precedent could be located in the experience of
indigenous peoples in the United States. Certainly the notion of the Do-
mestic Dependent Nation" and/or the juridical concept of the "alien na-
tion" ' 7 are quite similar to the subsequent unincorporated status of Puerto
Rico. Moreover, indigenous people were construed as an alien race living
under the tutelage of the federal government." The problem with estab-
lishing a direct parallel with the indigenous experience is that Puerto
Rico was treated as a territory, albeit unincorporated, whereas Indian
territories were considered domestic dependent nations. In other words,
while Puerto Rico could eventually become a state of the Union, domes-
tic dependent nations were precluded from becoming anything more than
11. It is interesting to note that even after Puerto Ricans became citizens of the United States,
the Supreme Court decided that the Bill of Rights applied differently to citizens residing on the
island, but once they became residents of the continental U.S., their entitlements would be restored.
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1922).
12. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, VOLUME I: STRUGGLES
FOR POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILT 44-48 (2d ed. 1991).
13. U.S. CONST. art. mII, § 2, cl. 1.
14. See, e.g., Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. 8, 10 (1799); Mossman v. Higginson,
4 U.S. 12, 14(1800).
15. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, VOLUME 1I: CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 293-94 (3d ed. 1997).
16. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17(1831).
17. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94,99 (1884).
18. See generally, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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an occupied territory. In addition, it is evident that lawmakers recognized
the existing Spanish civil law tradition in Puerto Rico as a "civilized"
form of law.'9
A. Treaty of Paris of 1898
The Spanish-Cuban-American War of 1898 marked a paradigmatic
shift in U.S. territorial policy. To be sure, Scott B. Cook summarizes the
forces shaping this historical moment as follows:
[Bly the 1890s continental expansion had reached its limit, dramatized
by the occupation of the immense area bordered by Canada, Mexico,
and the Pacific Ocean and cemented by the final elimination of Ameri-
can resistance at Wounded Knee (1890). In 1893 the historian Freder-
ick Jackson Turner pronounced the American frontier closed. It had, he
claimed, defined the American experience but it would no longer do so.
With British Canada and independent Mexico un-obtainable without a
costly war and international censure, some Americans turned an anx-
ious and hopeful gaze on overseas territories as the next beneficiaries of
America's great democratic and capitalist experiment.
2
0
With the conquest of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Cuba, the U.S.
moved from an "expansionist" territorial policy to an "imperialist" for-
eign policy. 21 Puerto Rico was formally conquered and ceded to the
United States on July 25, 1898, under the tenets of the Treaty of Paris of
1898. 22Although the validity of this treaty is questionable, the Treaty of
Paris has been recognized as the first juridical text to establish the hege-
monic relationship of the United States over Puerto Rico.3
For the purpose of this paper, I will focus my discussion on Article
IX of this treaty, which addressed the questions of citizenship, space, and
civil rights on the island. Article IX can be divided into three provisions.
The first provision outlines the rights of the Spanish subjects in Puerto
Rico and reads as follows:
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty,
may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom (sic), retaining
in either event all their rights of property, including the rights to sell or
dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall have the
19. See O'BRIEN, supra note 12, at 46.
20. SCOTT B. COOK, COLONIAL ENCOUNTERS IN THE AGE OF HIGH IMPERIALISM 93-94
(1996).
21. See generally ERNEST N. PAOLINO, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE,
WILJAM HENRY SEWARD AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1973).
22. 30 Stat. 1754, 1755, Art. I (1898).
23. See id. at 1754. This is an issue subject to significant jurisprudential debate given that the
Carta Auton6mica of 1897 required that Puerto Ricans participate in any decision-making process
that impacted the island on an international level. Puerto Ricans were not part of the discussions
surrounding Spain's cession of the island to the U.S.
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right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions being sub-
ject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreign-
24
ers.
This provision recognizes a distinction between the Spanish peninsular
(born on the Spanish peninsula) and the Spanish Creole (born on the is-
land).' This distinction is critical. First, from a historical point of view,
we should note that the Spanish concept of race was2Fenerally associated
with the individual's birthplace and his or her Casta. Presumably, Span-
ish Creoles born in Puerto Rico were inferior to the Spanish Peninsulars
with regard to the Spanish social hierarchy. Secondly, by recognizing a
birthright distinction in this treaty, the Spanish clearly established that
Puerto Ricans were not equals, thus undermining the 1897 Charter of
Autonomy. 27
The second provision directly addresses the allegiance and national-
ity of the residents of Puerto Rico.2 Under this provision, Spanish sub-
jects not born in the peninsula could retain allegiance to Spain by declar-
ing their loyalty in a local court. Otherwise, they would become nationals
of Puerto Rico.2 The creation of a Puerto Rican nationality enabled the
U.S. to eventually justify not naturalizing the island residents because
the' possessed a separate national identity. This policy led to the creation
of an ambiguous status somewhere between an alien and a national ow-
ing allegiance to the United States. Jos6 L6pez Baralt contends that this
is a departure from a previous policy of extending citizenship rights to
the residents of newly acquired territories.' ° He suggests that this depar-
ture can be attributed to the lack of desire of the U.S. to naturalize Filipi-
nos, as well as "the numerous uncivilized tribes" and Chinese inhabiting
the archipelago."
The concluding portion of Article IX stated that "the civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to
the United States shall be determined by the Congress." 32 Congress, how-
ever, neglected to pass any legislation until 1900.3' Thus, between 1898
and 1900, Puerto Rico was governed by a succession of military gover-
24. 30 Stat. 1754, 1759, Art. IX (1898).
25. See JOSt A. CABRANES, CrIZENSHIP ANDTHE AMERICAN EMPIRE 19-20 (1979).
26. The etymological meanings of the concept of Casta refer to social class, lineage, and
animal breed. It is a classification system that was instituted in Spain during the "Re-Conquest" and
the fifteenth century Inquisition.
27. See REECE B. BOTHWEL, TRANSFONDO CONSTITUCIONAL DE PUERTO RICO, PRIMERA
PARTE: 1887-1914 57 (1971).
28. See iL
29. 30 Stat. 1754, 1759, Art. IX (1898).
30. See JOSt LPEZ BARALT, THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS ITs
TERRIORIES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PUERTO RICO 211-12 (1999).
31. Id.
32. 30 Stat. 1754, 1759 Art. IX (1898).
33. See LOPEZ BARALT, supra note 30, at 192-93.
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nors under the direct authority of the President of the United States.
L6pez Baralt suggests that in the absence of any Congressional legisla-
tion the President could retain the power to decide how to govern the
island as Commander-in-Chief, assuming of course that he was engaged
in restoring peace and order.34
More importantly, this provision transferred authority to the Con-
gress, including the power to establish local courts of law on the island.
Eventually, the Puerto Rican legal system was re-developed by Congress
with the advice of these military governors. 35 The goal was to create a
legal system that was consistent with an Anglo-Saxon legal tradition.
In sum, the Treaty of Paris of 1898 became the foundation of the
jurisprudence that would define the contours of the subsequent juridical
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico, and a key docu-
ment in the creation of a Puerto Rican citizenship. First, the cession of
the island created an ambiguous tutelary status subject to U.S. Congres-
sional governance. Second, the cession established a Puerto Rican na-
tional subject that was distinct from the Spanish or the Anglo-American
citizen. This latter power enabled lawmakers to create an ambiguous
juridical/political status for Puerto Rico, clearly outside of the confines
of traditional territorial policies.
B. The Military Regime and General Davis
After the signing of the Treaty of Paris, President McKinley placed a
succession of military governors on the island whose main goal was "to
keep order, protect life and property, and get things ready for the estab-
lishment of a civil government in substitution of itself.' ' 6 The legal
source of their power was outlined in the General Order 101.37 More
importantly, the military governors were further charged with establish-
ing a legal regime and makin recommendations to the federal govern-
ment through special reports. These, in turn, informed lawmakers in
their policy-making initiatives. As one might suspect, these reports cap-
tured the racial prejudices that the generals used to understand the Puerto
Rican demography.
Trfas Monge contends that Brigadier General George W. Davis was
instrumental in the development of a Puerto Rican legal system that
could be integrated to the U.S. Anglo-Saxon legal system." While Davis
thought that the existing legal system in Puerto Rico was "un-American
and strange," he was confident that this "strangeness" would disappear
34. Seeld. at 194.
35. JOs TRIAS MONGE, EL SISTEMA JUDICIAL DE PUERTO RICO (1988).
36. L6PEZ BARALT, supra note 30, at 189.
37. H.R. DOC. NO. 1484, at 2177 (1909).
38. Id.
39. See TRWS MONGF, supra note 35, at 50-53.
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one by one and "ultimately a much more complete harmony of the Puerto
Rican with the American system of procedure will come into being." 4
This recognition of the civil code, albeit strange, eventually enabled
lawmakers to make a general distinction between Puerto Rico and other
territories, ascribing to the island an unprecedented level of judicial sov-
ereignty.
In addition to grappling with the island's legal system, Davis finds
himself trying to figure out how to "racialize" the Puerto Rican. Ulti-
mately, Davis constructs a sort of Puerto Rican racial alterity.4' The fa-
mous "Indian hunter" described the population of the island in the fol-
lowing manner:
The last census, that of 1897, showed that the pure-blood negroes have
numbered but 73,824 out of 899,394, while of the same total there were
242,000 mulattoes. Combining the full and mixed bloods, and designat-
ing them as colored (the term by which they are known in the States), it
would appear that the pure white are in a considerable majority; and
comparing both totals with the statistics of the year 1847 it would seem
that in that decennial period the numbers of these denominated above
as colored are not increasing in numbers, but instead have actually de-
creased.42
As this statement suggests, the Puerto Rican did not fit Davis' imagining
of an internal Other (black American), an external Other (Spaniard), nor
the Self (White Anglo-Saxon). This was further evidenced in his melan-
cholic complaint that "between the negro and the peon there is no visible
difference. It is hard to believe that the pale, sallow, and often emaciated
beings are the descendants of the conquistadores who carried the flag of
Spain to nearly all of South America, and to one-third of North Amer-
ica." 43
Thus at this early moment of conquest we can further discern the
racialization of a Puerto Rican race in an ambiguous way, and to a cer-
tain extent, in a status of alterity. In attempting to racialize the Puerto
Rican, Davis finds a white Puerto Rican that does not have the status of
the Anglo-Saxon, and a black/peon Puerto Rican that is not like the
American Negro. What is clear, however, is that while the
White/Caucasian Puerto Rican acquires an alterity status more akin to the
Anglo-Saxon, but never an equal, the black and the "peon" are repre-
sented in marginalized ways akin to the American Negro. Together with
the description of the existing legal system, these descriptions enable
40. George W. Davis, Report of Brig. Gen. Geo. W. Davis, U.S. V., on Civil Affairs of Puerto
Rico, 1899 at 26-27 (1900) [hereinafter Davis Report].
41. TPZVEAN TODOROV, THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA: THE QUESTION OF THE OTHER
(Richard Howard Trans.) (1982).
42. Davis Report, supra note 40, at 16.
43. Id. at 18.
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Congressional lawmakers to legitimize the creation of a distinct Puerto
Rican juridical space and its distinct Puerto Rican citizen.
C. The Foraker Act of 1900
The Foraker Act effectively ended the military regime's governance
and created a civil government for the island in 1900 under the direct
hegemony of the United States. L6pez Baralt notes that the Foraker Act
lays out three distinct political provisions, namely "the creation of a
Puerto Rican citizenship, the profferof American protection for the is-
land's citizenry, and the constitution of a body politic by these citi-
zens."'4 He further notes that
This creation of a special body politic, and the creation by express dec-
laration of citizenship of the territory, were departures from the former
territorial practice of Congress. One is tempted to ask what was the ob-
jective of Congress in making these provisions. We do not know of
any need that they fulfilled. On the contrary, it would seem that they
are misleading. Generally speaking, in public law, citizenship and sov-
ereignty are reciprocal and inseparable. The inhabitants of the Islands
were made citizens, - but of what? Of a body politic therein created
which undoubtedly was not sovereign in any international sense."5
Citing Senator Foraker, Bothwell contends that the objective of the.
Foraker Act was to annex Puerto Rico and place it in a tutorial condition
geared towards eventual statehood. This, however, resulted in the crea-
tion of an ambiguous liminal status that was tempered by both a colonial
condition and a territorial tradition. In fact, Puerto Rico acquired both
colonial attributes as well as territorial entitlements. Puerto Rico acquired
a foreign character for domestic purposes, yet it was located at the mar-
gins of a U.S..imperial border.
The Puerto Rican citizenship gave material expression to this am-
biguous status. Section VII of the General Provisions created a Puerto
Rican citizenship that required national loyalty while simultaneously
denying its bearer the basic protections of the U.S. Bill of Rights.47 The
language of the text is clear:
That all inhabitants continuing to reside therein who were Spanish sub-
jects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in Porto Rico, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of Porto Rico, and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall
have been elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain."
44. L6PEZ BARALT, supra note 30, at 208.
45. Id.
46. BOTHWE11, supra note 27, at 42.
47. 31 Stat. § 7 (1901).
48. Id.
[Vol. 78:4
2001] RACE, SPA CE AND THE PUERTO RICAN
Thus, the Puerto Rican citizen acquired the responsibilities of U.S. citi-
zenship with no protections or entitlements. Senator Foraker would later
argue that Puerto Ricans were "in a worse situation than aliens, for aliens
may become naturalized citizens of the United States and Puerto Ricans
can not." To be sure, Bothwell notes that under the immigration laws of
the period, one had to renounce his or her foreign citizenship in order to
acquire a U.S. citizenship. Puerto Ricans, however, were unable to re-
nounce their citizenship because it was not a foreign citizenship. Thus,
Puerto Ricans were unable to become U.S. citizens, and the Puerto Rican
citizenship in turn lacked an type of international recognition on ac-
count of its domestic nature. Puerto Ricans became juridical prisoners
at the gates of the empire.
11. INSULAR CASES
As I suggested earlier, my argument is further institutionalized by the
Supreme Court in a series of rulings beginning in 1901 known as the
Insular Cases." Constitutional historian David P. Currie has described
the rulings rendered in 1901 as the "most interesting and controversial
decisions about the Bill of Rights during the Fuller era . . . John W.
Burgess in turn once described these as "the most momentous, next to
that of domestic slavery." 3 These decisions have defined both the status
of Puerto Rico and its subsequent relationship to the United States. For
the purposes of this paper, I will only focus on a discussion of three is-
sues that can help contextualize my overall argument, namely the doc-
49. 36 Cong. Rec. 2894 (1903), cited in CABRANES, supra note 25, at 57 n. 243.
50. BOTHWEU, supra note 27, at 55.
51. See Efrdn Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular
Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225-328 (1996) (contending that the following cases can
generally be understood within the rubric of three sets of cases during three historical periods). In
general Rivera Ramos suggests that the first set of cases, decided in 1901, encompasses the
following: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. US, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Grossman v.
U.S., 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. U.S., 182 US 222 (1901); Armstrong v. U.S., 182 U.S. 243
(1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 US 244 (1901); Huus v. New York and Porto Rico Steamship
Company, 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley v. U.S., 183 U.S. 151 (1901); and The Diamond Rings, 183
U.S. 176 (1901). Rivera Ramos further locates the second set of cases between 1903 to 1914, and he
includes the following decisions: Haw. v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (103); Gonzdlez v. Williams, 192
U.S. 1 (1904); Kepner v. U.S., 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Doff v. U.S., 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Mendozana
v. U.S., 195 U.S. 158 (1904); Rasmussen v. U.S., 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Trono v. U.S., 199 U.S. 521
(1905); Grafton v. U.S., 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Kent v. Porto Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907); Kopel v.
Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909); Dowdell v. U.S., 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Ochoa v. Hernndez, 230
U.S. 139 (1913); and Ocampo v. U.S., 234 U.S. 91 (1914). Rivera Ramos further suggests that
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) consolidates the development of the Insular Cases. I
would suggest, however, that there are subsequent decisions, such as U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259 (1990), that could be read as a fourth stage of development of the Insular Cases doctrine.
52. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONS1TI.rON IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENIURY,
1888-1986 59 (1990).
53. John W. Burgess, The Decisions of the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases, 16 POL SCI.
Q. 3: 486-504, 486 (1901).
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trine of un-incorporation, the distinction between belonging and being a
part of the United States, and the reaffirmation of a Puerto Rican citizen-
ship. In my opinion, the contours of the resulting U.S.---Puerto Rico rela-
tionship were contingent upon a conceptualization of an inferior Puerto
Rican race.
Seven of the nine Insular Cases decided in 1901 addressed legal
questions regarding the status of Puerto Rico. In De Lima, the Court's
first ruling, the justices addressed the question of whether D.A. De Lima
and Co. could recover duties exacted by the Customs Office in New
York from certain importations of sugar emanating out of Puerto Rico
during 1899. 4 In this case, the petitioner argued that the exactions made
under the Tariff Act of 1897 did not apply to Puerto Rico because the
island had ceased to be a foreign country, as defined by the Act, after the
signing of the Treaty of Paris of 1898."5 Petitioners further argued that
Puerto Rico had become a territory of the United States and therefore any
imposition of taxes and excises on the island, not applicable to other
parts of the Union, would constitute a violation of the Uniformity Clause
of the Constitution. 6 The U.S. Attorney General countered that the Uni-
formity Clause applied to States and not to territories." Moreover, as
Efrdn Rivera Ramos succinctly notes, the Solicitor General further con-
tended that
(a) the act of cession did not make the territory, ipso facto, a part of the
United States, but merely a possession; (b) newly acquired territory be-
comes a part of the United States only if Congress so determines; (c)
the power of Congress over those territories that have not become a
part of the United States is "plenary," "absolute," "full and complete,"
subject only to fundamental limitations imposed by the Constitution, as
defined by the Courts. 58
The majority rejected the theory that presupposed that a
territory may be held indefinitely by the United States; that it may be
treated in every particular, except for tariff purposes, as domestic terri-
tory; that insurrections may be suppressed, wars carried on, revenues
collected, taxes imposed; in short, that everything may be done which a
government can do within its own boundaries, and yet the territory may
still remain a foreign country.59
However, the Court did acknowledge that "nonaction [sic] of Congress
may occasion a temporary inconvenience; but it does not follow that
54. See 182 U.S. at 44.
55. See id. at 45.
56. See id. at 46.
57. See id. at 47.
58. Rivera Ramos, supra note 51, at 243.
59. De Lina, 182 U.S. at 198.
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courts of justice are authorized to remedy it by inverting the ordinary
meaning of words."'
The Court concluded, "Porto Rico was not a foreign country within
the meaning of the tariff laws, but a territory of the United States, that
duties were illegally exacted, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover
them back., 6' The dissent, however, sought to locate the Puerto Rican in
the same juridical status as the "uncivilized" Indian. 2 By rethinking the
Puerto Rican case within the context of an uncivilized and savage para-
digm, the justices could situate Puerto Rico somewhere in between a
foreign and domestic status.
By the time that the Court rendered its opinion in the fifth Insular
Case, Puerto Rico had acquired a new status and a new doctrine was
born. In Downes, the Court ruled on the validity of a tariff tax imposed
on imJports from Puerto Rico after the passage of the Foraker Act in
1900. Justice Brown concluded that
If those possessions are inhabited by alien races, differing from us in
religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought, the
administration of government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon
principles, may for a time be impossible; and the question at once
arises whether large concessions ought not to be made for a time, that
ultimately our own theories may be carried out, and the blessings of a
free government under the Constitution extended to them. We decline
to hold that there is anything in the Constitution to forbid such action.
We are therefore of the opinion that the island of Porto Rico is a terri-
tory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of
the United States .... 64
As this citation suggests, Puerto Rico and the "alien race" that inhabited
the island had now become a possession belonging to, but not a part of,
the Anglo-Saxon empire.
In a concurring opinion, Justice White introduced a new doctrine of
"un-incorporation" that created a new status akin to the domestic de-
pendent nation. The Court concluded that neither the Treaty of Paris nor
the Foraker Act had incorporated Puerto Rico into the Union; therefore,
the island could be treated in a different manner than that in which
States, territories, and possessions were treated. This status, in turn, pro-
vided the justices with an excuse for treating the "alien race" residing in
the island differently than other U.S. citizens, especially since the is-
land's inhabitants were not entitled to the protection of the Bill of
60. Id
61. Id. at 199.
62. See it at 219.
63. See id. at 249-50.
64. Dowries, 182 U.S. at 287.
2001]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Rights.6 Surely, the Court reasoned, the responsibilities of the Bill of
Rights could not be entrusted upon an uncivilized people. To be sure,
incorporation, argued White, would require that Puerto Ricans become
U.S. citizens, and Congress had not drafted a bill supporting the collec-
tive naturalization of the islanders.6 Thus, if Congress wished to incorpo-
rate Puerto Rico and its inhabitants into the United States, then it could
draft a bill and ratify it, or so the logic went.
The Court's subsequent reaffirmation of the Foraker citizenship is
further illustrative of the law's creation of an anomalous category in-
formed by a racial paradigm. Take for example the ruling in Gonzdlez,
which addressed the detention of Isabela Gonzdlez on August 24, 1902
upon her arrival to New York.67 She was detained by the Immigration
Commissioner and was prevented from entering the country because she
was an "alien imnmigrant." ' The Commissioner sought to bar her entry
into the U.S. under the provisions of the Alien Immigration Act of 1891.
9
In a unanimous decision, the Court concluded that since Gonztlez was a
native resident of Puerto Rico during the passage of the Treaty of Paris
she was not considered an alien immigrant within the meaning of the act
in question.7° Moreover, the Gonzdlez ruling suggests, that the Court
could continue to regulate the movement of bodies, namely Chinese, and
"certain classes of aliens or alien immigrants," into and out of the na-
tion.7' To be sure, the Court argued that
We think it clear that the act relates to foreigners as respects this coun-
try, to persons owing allegiance to a foreign government, and citizens
or subjects thereof; and that citizens of Porto Rico, whose permanent
allegiance is due to the United States; who live in the peace of the do-
minion of the United States; the organic laws of whose domicil was en-
acted by the United States, and is enforced through officials sworn to
support the Constitution of the United States, -are not 'aliens,' and
upon their arrival by water at the ports of our mainland are not 'alien
immigrants,' within the intent and meaning of the act of 1891.72
The decision established a new juridical status located between a U.S.
citizenship and a foreign national. Puerto Ricans, although not aliens in
the sense of the "Chinese laborers" were not Anglo-Saxons either, and
thus not able to become citizens. The result was a separate and unequal
status that would be in place until World War I and in particular, until the
65. See id. at 314.
66. Id., at 315.
67. See Gonzdlez, 192 U.S. at 7.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 12.
71. Id. at 13.
72. Id.
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passage of the Jones Act of 1917 which provided for the collective natu-
ralization of the Puerto Rican people.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
By way of conclusion, I suggest that the Puerto Rican citizenship is
not necessarily a direct result of racist law making. At present, it is un-
clear to me whether racist policy makers could have justified the creation
of a separate and distinct Puerto Rican citizenship, using race as a deter-
minative criteria. This is not to say that race is not a factor in the inven-
tion and subsequent institutionalization of a Puerto Rican citizenship.
Rather my contention is that lawmakers had to construct a distinct juridi-
cal space in which to locate the Puerto Rican citizenship. In this sense,
Anglo-Saxon racist ideologies informed the invention of a liminal juridi-
cal space, which in turn could legitimize a corresponding Puerto Rican
citizenship. In other words, the status of the Puerto Rican space became a
precondition of the construction of a Puerto Rican citizenship.

